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Judicial Review and Ombuds: A Systematic Analysis  
 
Richard Kirkham and Elizabeth A. O’Loughlin 
 






There is a growing body of literature that studies the amorphous nature of administrative law 
and identifies the ways that its practice does not perfectly map onto the general principles of 
administrative law as expounded in textbooks.1 This is well evidenced in the existence of silos 
of administrative law scholarship, with discrete specialisations long existing in areas such as 
housing law, or social security and welfare law. Such scholarship recognises and critiques legal 
questions that are particular to the administrative context, and developed through narrow case 
law developments on the meaning of statutory provisions.2 
  
This article makes two contributions to this body of literature. First, it provides a systematic 
account of the approach the courts take in reviewing decisions of ombuds. In scholarship on 
ombuds in the UK, there is a paucity of studies on the relationship between the courts and 
ombuds3 and no systematic study that analyses ombud judicial review as a discrete body of 
law. To that end, this article finds that the dominant approach of the courts is one of deference 
to ombud decision-making and loyalty to general principles of administrative law. Even so, 
there is a significant strand of case law that has exercised a powerful structuring function over 
the ombud sector. Through this function the courts have filled a gap in the oversight of the 
sector, interpreting legislation and the common law to facilitate new remedies and encourage 
the development of heightened standards of procedural fairness and transparency in decision-
making. Such findings assist in the second contribution: albeit in relation to only one confined 
body of case law, this article further demonstrates the existence of a lacuna between general 
accounts of administrative law doctrine and empirical reality. In doing so, it evidences one key 
explanation for that lacuna, that the courts use the opportunity of reviewing specialised 
statutory functions to develop tailored case law for particular administrative contexts. 
 
The article progresses in three stages. The first section details the contribution and method of 
the study. The second stage presents the results of our case study in two parts. We conclude 
with an analysis of our findings and some implications for wider research on judicial review. 
                                                 
 Senior Lecturer, University of Sheffield. 
 Assistant Professor, Durham University. We are grateful for the support of the Nuffield Foundation and, for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts, to Joe Tomlinson, Graham Gee, Sarah Nason, Carol Harlow, Chris Gill and 
Dimtrios Tsarapatsanis and especially the feedback of the reviewers. 
1 For a recent example, see generally S. Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review (Hart, 2016). 
2 For example, what amounts to “intentional homelessness” under s. 193 Housing Act 1996. See Carla Reeson, 
“Intentional Homelessness and Affordability of Accommodation” (2019) 41(4) J.S.W.F.L. 483. 
3 Exceptions include Richard Kirkham and Alexander Allt, “Making Sense of the Case Law on the Ombudsman” 
(2016) 38(2) J.S.W.F.L. 211; Brian Thompson, “The Courts’ Relationship to Ombudsmen – Supervisor or 
Partner?” (2015) 37(1) J.S.W.F.L. 137; and Richard Kirkham, Brian Thompson and Trevor Buck, “When Putting 
Things Right Goes Wrong: Enforcing the Recommendations of the Ombudsman” [2008] P.L. 510; J.N.E. 





The Ombud/ Judiciary Relationship  
 
The ombud as a case study 
 
A main focus of this study is the approach of the judiciary towards the ombud office in public 
law litigation, and what this tells us about the relationship between the two. The ombud has 
been described as a “constitutional misfit”4 given its novel status in the legal order, which 
renders its relationship with the courts somewhat opaque. For most ombuds, statute itself has 
virtually nothing to say on this relationship.   
 
There is no single definition of an ombud, but its main role is handling complaints about 
maladministration, poor service or unfair treatment by those whom the ombud has the power 
to investigate.5 It is this complaint handling function that is primarily challenged in judicial 
review. Although many public bodies provide a complaint-handling service, ombud services 
are distinct. They are an independent office that operates autonomously from day-to-day 
political control, with decisions on complaints considered by the courts only on points of law. 
The first ombud introduced in the UK was the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
in 1967.6 The full impact of this innovation is contested, but the transplant of the ombud into 
the UK represented a novel and bold shift in approach towards administrative justice at a time 
when there was a wider rebalancing of relationships between the administrative state and the 
citizen. 7  There are now at least 17 separate statutory schemes that perform ombud-like 
functions, and several others that could potentially be subject to judicial review.8  
 
Two ombud-like institutions, the Pensions Ombudsman and the Scottish Legal Complaints 
Commissioner (SLCC), are provided with a statutory appeal process, with the latter’s 
legislation detailing a set of grounds of appeal to courts that are broadly comparable to the 
grounds of judicial review.9 For both appeal processes, however, judicial consideration is based 
on appeal on the law, not on fact.10 For all other schemes, judicial review is the only legal 
remedy available to complainants if they are unhappy with the decision of an ombud.11 The 
first judicial review against an ombud was heard in 1978, and as of December 2019 this study 
had identified 109 public law challenges against ombuds decisions.12 Most of these cases (93) 
have been heard since 2002.13 There therefore seems to be a correlation between the expansion 
                                                 
4 R. Snell, “Towards an Understanding of a Constitutional Misfit: Four Snapshots of the Ombudsman Enigma” in 
Chris Finn (ed), Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law, 2000) 188. 
5 See Ombudsman Association, “Schedule 1 to the Rules: Criteria for the Recognition of Ombudsman Offices”, 
http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/docs/OA-Rules-Schedule-1.pdf [accessed 21 January 2020], 1. 
6 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. 
7 See T. Buck, R. Kirkham, and B. Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (Routledge, 
2010), ch. 1. 
8 Kirkham and Allt, “Making Sense of the Case Law on the Ombudsman”, 214. 
9 Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007 s. 21(4). 
10 ibid. See also Pension Schemes Act 1993 s. 151(4). 
11 For some schemes the question of whether they can be subject to judicial review is as yet unresolved, eg Prisons 
and Probation Ombudsman, Ombudsman Services, Furniture Ombudsman.    
12 See R. Kirkham and E. O’Loughlin, “A Study into Ombud Judicial Review Online Appendix: Evidence of 
Results” (2020), http://www.xxx [Accessed 20 January 2020], A2-3; and n 44 below. 
13 This study did not include the small jurisprudence of the pre-2002 private sector financial ombud schemes, as 
at the time the courts did not apply a consistent approach towards reviewing such schemes eg R. v Insurance 
Ombudsman Bureau Ex p. Aegon Life Assurance Ltd [1994] C.L.C. 88; [1995] L.R.L.R. 101. 
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of the sector, and an increase in the amount of users choosing recourse to judicial review, with 
there being on average five fully heard cases per year plus a similar number of permission 
hearings since that date.14  
 
The ombud and general principles of administrative law 
 
At the heart of this study is a desire to systematically record the approach that the courts take 
in reviewing ombud decisions. Academic debate on the relationship between the courts and 
ombuds ranges from describing it as appropriately deferential 15  to close to triggering a 
legitimacy crisis.16 In order for such arguments to take place, there must be a solid evidence 
base of the real practice of ombud administrative law. In our pursuit of this evidence base, we 
present a hypothesis: that the courts are likely to tailor the development of case law to the 
demands of the sector, taking into account the ombud’s distinct features as an independent 
actor in the accountability architecture. Such “institutional entrepreneurship”17  is possible 
because the judiciary possesses considerable scope to shape how judicial review is 
undertaken, 18  and within the common law tradition can deploy the standards found in 
administrative law doctrine as adjustable parameters, applied more or less intensely dependent 
on the context and the individual judge.19 It is only possible to test this hypothesis in relation 
to the dataset presented here, but is likely that such dynamics are present in other corners of 
administrative law.  
 
If a bespoke approach to ombud case law is identified, this evidence complements those 
accounts of administrative law which are skeptical of the treatment of the discipline as “a 
cluster of legal structures which apply generally across all areas of public administration”.20 
The generalist approach is most often associated with the way in which administrative law 
principles are presented as a coherent taxonomy of legal grounds.21 The attractiveness of this 
approach as an instruction on the judicial role can be understood to have at least two normative 
underpinnings: the importance of establishing certainty and predictability in decision-making, 
and the need to render the judiciary properly accountable for their choices.22  
 
The empirical accuracy of the generalist administrative law approach has long come under 
scrutiny. For some the concern is the failure of the judiciary to develop or sufficiently adhere 
to a consistent model of formal legal doctrine in public law.23 For others, judicial decision-
                                                 
14 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, A8.  
15 See Kirkham and Allt, “Making Sense of the Case Law on the Ombudsman”, 224. 
16 Varuhas, Judicial Capture of Political Accountability, 5. 
17 T.T. Arvind and Lindsay Stirton, “Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top Judges” [2016] P.L. 418, 
422. 
18 Richard Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review” (2008) 61(1) C.L.P. 95. 
19 E. A. Posner and A. Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (OUP, 2011) ch. 3.  
20 Joanna Bell, “Reason-Giving in Administrative Law: Where We Are and Why Have the Courts Not Embraced 
the ‘General Common Law Duty the Give Reasons’?” (2019) 82(6) M.L.R. 983, 1004. Harlow and Rawlings have 
referred to this tendency as a form of ‘tailoring’: C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, 3rd edn 
(CUP, 2009) 625. 
21 See e.g. W. Wade, Administrative Law (OUP, 1961).The lasting impact of Wade’s ‘common law method’ is 
well-explored in Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, “Administrative Law in Context: Restoring a Lost 
Connection” [2014] P.L. 28, 39. 
22 J.N.E. Varuhas, “Taxonomy and Public Law” in M. Elliott, J.N.E. Varuhas and S. Wilson Stark (eds), The Unity 
of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Hart, 2018) 39. 
23 See generally C. Forsyth, “‘Blasphemy Against Basics’ Doctrine, Conceptual Reasoning and Certain Decisions 
of the UK Supreme Court” in J. Bell, M. Elliot, J.N.E. Varuhas and P. Murray (eds), Public Law Adjudication in 
Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Hart, 2016) 145. 
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making has become too focused on the contextual circumstances of the case.24 Elsewhere it has 
been argued that there is a dissonance between theory and practice in administrative law, with 
the grounds stressed in standard textbook templates frequently not matching the pattern of 
actual judicial decision-making applied in the courts.25 This latter finding does not necessarily 
entail that general principles of administrative law are either inappropriate or non-existent but, 
at best, it would suggest that a generalist approach under-explains the nature of judicial 
decision-making. This finding might also point to an in-built tailoring dimension to 
administrative law which has been inadequately captured in most accounts. There may, in other 
words, be good reasons why flexibility should be catered for in administrative law and not 
driven out by normative presuppositions imposed by common law design.26 Far from being a 
license for uncertainty, the tailoring of administrative law is a very standard example of the 
common law in action with principles applied consistently in a specific context. One obvious 
driver for variability in judicial decision-making is the differences in the nature of statutory 
schemes that are subject to judicial review and the impracticability of devising one set of 
useable doctrine to define all public law.27  
 
Research methods in public law 
 
If there is a dissonance between general theories of administrative law and judicial practice, 
part of the explanation is that although forceful claims about the appropriate parameters of 
judicial decision-making are sometimes made, in UK legal scholarship at least, there is a 
relative shortage of studies that attempt systematically to evidence practice.28 This shortfall in 
the literature is surprising given the long tradition of legal realist critique that legal doctrine, 
by itself, fails to explain the manner in which judicial decisions are made.29 This tendency 
exposes legal scholarship to a number of risks, such as an excessive focus upon appellant-level 
and strong precedent setting cases, or that case analysis is driven by conscious or unconscious 
research biases,30 or that supporting evidence is sometimes “unclear or difficult for others to 
probe or falsify”.31 These combined deficits carry the risk that claims and counter-claims as to 
the state of judicial review are conducted through a “war of examples” and absent of full 
context.32 To counter-balance these various risks, empirical legal research is an important part 
of legal scholarship. This article uses one form of empirical research, systematic content 
analysis, to provide an in-depth account of how judges reason their decisions in a particular 
context. 
 
Care should be taken not to overstate the capacity of empirical legal research. Where coding 
criteria is applied it must very carefully and rigorously constructed. Even once such design 
work has been put in place, any endeavour to reduce the meaning of a large body of cases to a 
                                                 
24 Varuhas, “Taxonomy and Public Law”, 51-53. 
25 Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review, ch. 6.  
26 Paul Craig, ‘”Taxonomy and public law: a response” [2019] P.L. 281, 300-301. 
27 Bell, “Reason-Giving in Administrative Law”, 1007-1008. 
28 For a reference list of recent examples of systematic empirical scholarship on judicial review, see Kirkham and 
O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, A7. 
29 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, “Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a 
New Legal Theory?” (2009) 95(1) Cornell L. Rev. 61. 
30 Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, “An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship” (2015) 44(2) 
J.L.S. 277, 286–293. 
31 Will Baude, Adam S Chilton, and Anup Malani, “Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from 
Systematic Reviews” (2017) 84(1) U Chi L Rev 37. 




uniform system of coding will lose some of the subtleties and nuances upon which a decision 
is based. Judicial decision-making is driven by various factors, including the factual context of 
the case, the judge’s internal approach to legal reasoning, and other personal or case 
management features of the dispute such as the quality of representation.33 Further, judgments 
may only provide a ‘post-decision’ rationalisation of the judge’s thought-process and the real 
driver behind a decision might be hidden.34 Given the room for uncertainty as to cause and 
effect, therefore, the argument for systematic empirical scholarship is primarily a supportive 
one to other methods and insights. Systematic studies can provide an objective means by which 
to identify “anomalies which may escape the naked eye”.35 It has a role to play in testing, and 
possibly confirming, pre-held positions, and isolating outlier cases.36 It also provides a stronger 
foundation for future research than snapshot perceptions of the law based on a selective 
overview. Above all, by forcing the author to supply the evidence and methods behind the 
claims being made, the systematic approach obliges the researcher to be more transparent about 
the research limits of their work and thereby reduces the risk of normative biases driving the 
analysis. In all these respects, the systematic approach offers value in informing debates about 




To simplify the empirical study in this article, we focus only upon the textual evidence of the 
judge’s reasoning and the recorded outcomes of cases. In order to establish a “similarly 
weighted”37 and easily repeatable selection of cases for empirical enquiry, this study focuses 
on 109 cases up to December 2019 in which a determination of an ombud-like body38 had been 
challenged in the senior courts and heard by way of a full hearing.39 Although it is not possible 
to verify that all ombuds cases have been captured, where possible, the selection was verified 
with the scheme concerned.  
 
To unpick the work being carried out by the judiciary in this body of case law, we coded all 
the arguments considered in judgments.40 The primary research method deployed was content 
analysis, which is a form of discourse analysis used to record and code targeted aspects of the 
content of documented decisions. The claimed value of content analysis studies is an 
epistemological one, in that ‘the research results matter more than the researcher’s authority’.41 
Value-judgements cannot be avoided altogether, as any form of qualitative assessment creates 
                                                 
33 David Williams, “The Case-Law of Administrative Law” (1982) 6 Trent L.J. 1, 3. 
34 Dan Simon and Nicholas Scurich, “Judicial Overstating” (2013) 88(2) Chi-Kent L. Rev. 411. 
35 Alan L. Tyree, “Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and Limitations” (1981) 22(1) Jurimetrics J. 1, 
23.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (2008) 96(1) C.L.R. 
63, 64. 
38 We chose not to include appeal cases brought against the Pensions Ombudsman in this study (there have been 
over 200 such cases) as its remit is subtly different to most ombud-like schemes. We did though include eight 
appeal cases brought against the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission. We justify this inclusion on the basis 
that it is a heavily constrained form of appeal, and the legal grounds for appeal in essence match those available 
in judicial review: Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007 s 21(4). Overall, the patterns we identified 
for this scheme were in line with other schemes in the study.  
39 As identified through the law databases: British and Irish Legal Information Institute, Westlaw and LexisNexis. 
See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, A2-3 for further details on our database search. 
40 For a full explanation of the method and typology deployed, see Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, 
A1. 
41 See Hall and Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions”, 66.  
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the potential for subjective evaluation.42  Value judgments, however, can be reduced to a 
minimum by working though specific coding protocols which are fully disclosed. Through this 
approach, potential criticisms are offset by being open about the choices that have been made. 
To be credible, content analysis requires the themes selected for interrogation, and the design 
of a codification scheme, to be capable of enough objective detail to allow others to replicate 
the study. Arbitrary subjectivity can be further reduced by double-blind coding on a sample of 
cases, as was applied in this study. To foster transparency we have made available on an open 
access website more detail on the findings listed in this article, together with a full account of 
our method and coding scheme.43 
 
For our purposes here the choice of grounds that we coded for is not important, instead what is 
of interest is the extent to which different grounds of law drove the arguments presented to the 
court and judicial decision-making. To isolate relevant lines of inquiry, we grouped the grounds 
of administrative law under six broad categories of review that capture the essence of what is 
being considered by the court (statutory interpretation, procedural impropriety, discretionary 
impropriety, mistake, breach of ECHR and quality of decision).44 According to this taxonomy 
of grounds, our study revealed that the main targets of legal argument adopted by the claimant 
are decisions allegedly made outside an ombud’s powers (statutory interpretation) and 
decisions which are allegedly flawed either in substance or in the reasoning that accompanies 
them (quality of decision).45 This pattern becomes even more pronounced when we consider 
only the grounds that are successful against an ombud (see Figure 1).46   
 





                                                 
42 For a critique of the concept of objectivity in research methodologies, see Andrew Halpern, “The Methodology 
of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years Off the Point” (2006) 19(1) C.J.L.J. 67. 
43 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, A1-4, which details our method and explains our choice of 
sample.  
44 A subtly revised version of the template adopted in Sarah Nason’s pioneering study, Reconstructing Judicial 
Review, 25, 146. 
45 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, A5. 
46 Figure 1 includes all grounds found against an ombud, with in some cases more than one ground being 
successful.  




















In order to further understand what kind of supervisory relationship exists between ombud 
services and the courts, we also coded to capture the judiciary’s approach to statutory 
interpretation and other targeted aspects of judicial decision-making that would help prove or 
disprove the existence of a bespoke set of ombud jurisprudence.  
 
 




A striking feature of this study is the central role played by statutory interpretation in ombud 
judicial review. In 87 out of the 109 body of cases the court undertook some form of detailed 
legislative interpretation (see Table 1). Further, as noted above (Figure 1), one of the most 
common grounds for ombud decisions to be quashed was a failure to interpret statute correctly. 
This finding broadly mirrors the trend in all judicial review.48  
 
Statutory interpretation is an entirely conventional aspect of standard administrative law 
accounts and one in which choices have to be made. On those choices, there is some 
disagreement49 as to the extent to which a judge can appropriately arrive at an interpretation of 
statute that “does not accord with the ordinary meaning of wording of the provision”.50 To gain 
an understanding of how the judiciary manage this disagreement, we coded the reasoning 
technique deployed in judgments through a threefold typology of literal, textual and contextual 
techniques, each of which we detail more below.51  A difficulty with classifying judgments this 
way is that judgment writing can be opaque or misleading, or the reasoning blunt and cursory. 
As a result, it may not be possible to explain the interpretative choice made by the judge other 
than through inference. Notwithstanding this insight and the risks of ‘over-interpreting’,52 the 
‘tools’ of the judicial trade do require judges to provide reasons for their decisions and it is 
reasonable to hold them to account for those stated reasons.53 In this study we have relied upon 
the documented evidence of the interpretation technique being deployed in the judgment 
(whether explicit or implicit) to understand the interpretive method that is adopted.54 In doing 
so, we identified four broad trends in ombud case law.  
 
 
(i) The dominance of literal and narrow interpretations of statutes 
 
The dominant finding is that in almost all cases the judiciary did not use their interpretative 
powers expansively. This suggests that in ombud judicial review cases, the courts adhere fairly 
                                                 
48 Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review, 159.  
49 On this debate, see Laurence B. Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction” (2010) 27(1) Const. 
Comment 95; Quintavalle  v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 W.L.R. 692; [2003] UKHL 13 at [8]. 
50 Bradley C. Canon, “Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism” (1983) 66(6) Judicature 236, 242. 
51 This threefold typology differs subtly from that applied in a similar content analysis study into EU copyright 
law: Marcella Favale, Martin Kretschmer and Paul C. Torremans, “Is there an EU Copyright Jurisprudence? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Workings of the European Court of Justice” (2016) 79(1) M.L.R. 31. 
52 See Simon and Scurich, “Judicial Overstating”.  
53 Keenan D. Kmiec, “The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism” (2004) 92(5) C.L.R. 1441, 1473. 
54 Leonardo Pierdominici, “Constitutional Adjudication and the ‘Dimensions’ of Judicial Activism: Comparative 
Legal and Institutional Heuristics” (2012) 3(3) T.L.T. 207, 233. 
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closely to standard accounts of ultra vires: that the courts apply the intent of the legislature as 
expressed in the words.55 Table 1 presents the results of the coding exercise.  
 
Table 1: Judicial approach towards statutory interpretation in ombudsman judicial review56 
 
No interpretation approach applied 22 
Literal  70 
Textual  12 
Contextual 5 
 
Of those cases in which a measure of interpretation or direct application of the law was 
required, we found that in 80 per cent the judiciary adopted a strict literal interpretation of the 
law. The most obvious scenario for the literal approach to be adopted is where the case hinges 
upon the meaning of a specific legal provision about which the parties disagree.57 An expanded 
version of this form of interpretation is where the provision in question directs the interpreter 
to an additional legal source in order to confer it meaning.58  
 
Although our study indicates that judges display a strong preference for narrow literal 
interpretations of statute, Table 1 reveals an occasional adoption of interpretation techniques 
that rely less on the specific text being applied, which we grouped into textual and contextual 
approaches. With textual interpretation the distinction from literal techniques is not water-tight, 
but in essence meaning of a single legal provision is constructed in situations where it cannot 
be confidently asserted from the wording of that single legal provision alone. For instance, by 
this method the provision in question might be read alongside other parts of the statute to 
establish consistency and purpose in legislation, or the judge might seek to examine the “four 
corners of the statute” to gain an understanding of Parliament’s intent in the context of its text 
alone (reading the statute in the round).59 This approach is defended by many as the most 
legitimate approach to judicial reasoning in difficult cases where ambiguity or vagueness in 
the text is present.60 By contrast, with contextual interpretations of statute, the judge overtly 
goes beyond the statute to understand the semantic context of the text with the aid of additional 
sources of evidence. This involves “a more open and systematic consideration of any legislative 
purpose, and of any relevant principles (and policies)”.61 With both textual and contextual 
interpretations, because they require the judge to go beyond the literal wording of an individual 
text, extra room is created for judicial discretion to expand the law towards a broader meaning 
than is strictly necessary and to develop a bespoke approach to the application of administrative 
law standards. 
 
Just because a judge moves beyond literal interpretation techniques, however, it does not 
necessarily follow that the judiciary are overtly expanding the law. Drawing this conclusion 
requires deeper analysis of the nature of the intepretative challenge in question. There may be 
a range of reasons which justify a judge moving beyond the literal method, many of which are 
                                                 
55 Paul P. Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review” (1998) 57(1) C.L.J. 63, 64-65; Paul Craig, 
“Competing Models of Judicial Review” (1999) P.L. 428. 
56 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B1 and B2. 
57 See Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction”. 
58 For an example from this study, see R (Marazona Properties Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2017] 
EWHC 1135 (Admin); [2017] W.L.U.K 444. 
59 John F. Manning, “Textualism and the Equity of the Statute” (2001) 101(1) Colum. L. Rev. 1. 
60 Richard Ekins, “The Intention of Parliament” [2010] P.L. 709. 
61 Andrew Ashworth, “Interpreting Criminal Statutes: a Crisis of Legality?” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 419, 446.  
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accounted for in standard formalist accounts of the law.62 In the ombud case study, three 
justificatory reasons best explain the choices adopted (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Explanations for cases in which non-literal interpretation techniques were applied 
 
 
The first reason we found for non-linguistic interpretative techniques was to add more rigour 
to an interpretation, presumably because the judge felt the need to justify a decision through 
further legal analysis. In our sample, in all instances the non-literal approach of the court was 
supportive of literal reasoning, and did not exapnd the authority of the court over the ombud.63   
 
The second explanation for non-literal interpretative techniques being deployed was where the 
core legal dispute revolved around potentially conflicting provisions in legislation which 
necessarily meant that there were two rival interpretations available. In order to resolve the 
dilemma, the judge read across the legislation to determine which interpretation to give 
precedence. For instance, in Armagh City Council, Re Judicial Review,64 the legal question was 
whether by law the Commissioner for Complaints had the power to accept a complaint from a 
GP, notwithstanding that the GP received money out of the public purse. According to Article 
10(1)(d)(ii) of the Commissioner for Complaints Order (NI) 1997 ‘bodies’ that receive public 
monies are excluded from submitting complaints. However, the question of what constituted a 
‘body’ under Article10(1)(d)(ii) was ambiguous, a challenge which the court chose to resolve 
by reading the provision alongside Article 8 which, for the entirely separate purpose of 
detailing the bodies that are subject to investigation, listed GPs as individuals. In only two of 
the seven cases which fell into this category65 did the court conclude that the ombud had 
deployed an incorrect interpretation of the law,66 nor did it use this interpretative method to 
constrain the relevant ombud’s discretionary power.67  
 
What this study reveals, therefore, is that in ombud case law, when judges adopt techniques of 
statutory interpretation that potentially allow for the judge to move away from a standard literal 
approach, that technique is most commonly undertaken in order to clarify narrow and 
ambiguous points of law, rather than to expand the law or place added controls on the ombud. 
Indeed, non-literal techniques of interpretation were more likely to be deployed to support 
administrative discretion, than to overturn it.  
 
(ii) Use of judicial creativity to raise standards 
 
                                                 
62  Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd edn (OUP, 2009); Paul Craig, 
Administrative Law, 6th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 482-84.  
63 For a list of these cases, see Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B3.1. 
64 [2014] NICA 44; [2014] 6 W.L.U.K. 371. 
65 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B3.2. 
66 AC v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (2017) (Claim Non.CO/5366/2016) available 
on the website of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education; Council of The Law Society of 
Scotland v Scottish Legal Complaints Commission (SLCC) [2017] CSIH 36; 2017 S.C. 718. 
67 IFG Financial Services Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Services Ltd [2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin); [2006] 1 
B.C.L.C. 534; Hession v Health Service Commissioner for Wales [2001] EWHC 619 (Admin). 
 Ombud decision 
upheld 
Ombud decision not 
upheld 
Total 
To add rigour to literal reading  4 1 5 
To resolve conflicting provisions  5  2 7 
To read in meaning to statute 1 4 5 
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It is only when we come to the third explanation for non-literal techniques identified in this 
study that the work of the court moved away from purely interpreting the law to reading extra 
meaning into the statute which was not strictly necessary from the wording. Although only five 
out of 109 cases fell into this category, this form of interpretative work indicates two further 
trends in ombud case law. First, courts are willing to use non-linguistic interpretation 
techniques to exert added controls over the ombud by establishing a more restricted set of 
parameters around the ombud’s discretionary power. We only found two cases in our study 
that match this description, but they stand out as exhibiting a reserve ambition of the courts to 
ensure enhanced standards of procedural fairness in the ombudn sector. Notably, both cases 
were heard in the appeal courts.  
 
In Cavanagh, the court read in a limitation to the discretion conferred on the ombud to 
determine the extent of a complaint (section 3(2), Health Service Commissioners Act 1993), 
by ruling that ombudsm investigations were restricted by the terms of the original complaint.68 
It achieved this result by reading section 3 of the Act alongside section 11(1), which required 
notice to be given to affected parties before commencing an investigation. The Court found 
that the ombud had expanded her investigation midway into a complaint without giving due 
notice, and in doing so had “exceeded [her] statutory powers, not technically or marginally but 
so substantially as to vitiate it in its entirety”.69 Cavanagh, therefore, read into the statute a 
clear limit on the ombud’s discretionary power to establish the boundaries of the complaint that 
was not expressly provided for, but could be inferred following a broad reading of the Act. 
This finding has since been justified as upholding a level of disclosure that accords with the 
duty of fairness.70 
 
The other example is the Supreme Court ruling in JR55. 71  Here the Court held that the 
Commissioner for Complaints for Northern Ireland did not have the power to recommend that 
a GP pay financial compensation. The relevant provision in question gave the Commissioner a 
general discretionary power to secure a settlement without any reference to possible 
restrictions. The Court, however, inferred restrictions on that power through an expansive 
textual reading of the legislation as a whole. The approach of the Supreme Court has come 
under heavy scrutiny72, but was justified by the court as being confined to its facts, Lord 
Sumption describing the case as “moot”, being that it involved an ombud scheme that was 
drawing to a close.73 Though only time will tell, as of yet, the case seems to have had limited 
impact on the bench’s approach in ombud cases more generally, there being only a cursory and 
dismissive reference to the case in a single later case.74 
 
(iii) Using judicial creativity to emphasise the legal status of a body 
 
The second way that the courts have interpreted legislation more expansively is to develop 
clarity on the ombud’s powers and the ombud/court relationship. In three cases the court 
expanded upon the meaning of the ombud’s power to determine either ‘maladministration’ or 
‘injustice’ by reference to the broader purpose of the legislation.75 In none of those cases, did 
                                                 
68 R (Cavanagh) v Health Service Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 1578; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1229 at [38]-[39]. 
69 ibid [47]. 
70 Miller v The Health Service Commissioner for England [2018] EWCA Civ 144; [2018] P.T.S.R. 801 at [47]. 
71 JR55, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2016] UKSC 22; [2016] 4 All E.R. 779. 
72 Richard Kirkham, “JR55, Judicial Strategy and the Limits of Textual Reasoning” [2017] PL 46, 54-55. 
73 JR55 at [5].  
74 Miller at [85]-[86]. 
75 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B3.3. 
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the interpretation directly impact on the decision in the case or restrict the authority of the 
ombud, instead in all three the judiciary laid down landmark statements of support for the 
ombud office which have been repeated in multiple cases since.76 
 
Although not specifically concerning statutory interpretation, additionally there are sixteen 
cases in which obiter statements were made to reinforce the broad discretionary power of the 
ombud with reference to the underlying intent of the statutory scheme.77 Similarly, at least 
sixteen cases detail the limited public law role of the courts in reviewing an ombud, with 
multiple others acknowledging more briefly this position.78 In all instances the judicial strategy 
was to advance an account of the ombud’s legal position that was consistent with the purpose 
of the legislative scheme involved, and largely supportive of the ombud office. 
 
(iv) Evidence of ‘allocating powers’ 
 
A final trend is worthy of note. Although multiple different factors lead to statute being 
scrutinised in court, the most common theme in ombud case law is the need to adjudicate on 
the allocation of powers between different institutions where there is an explicit or implicit 
conflict in effective authority. In the case sample, perhaps the most important example of 
allocating power involved the competing jurisdictions of an ombud and the court. In several 
cases the relevant ombud/court conflict concerned the question of whether an ombud can 
persist with a complaint in which a judicial remedy is available, or can undertake an 
investigation even though a judicial remedy has already been sought.79 An example is the 
jurisdictional bar upon the Local Commissioner of Administration Commissioner’s 
commencing an investigation if there is “any action in respect of which the person has or had 
a remedy by way of proceedings in any court of law”.80 This provision is offset by a discretion 
for the Commissioner to accept complaints “if satisfied that in the particular circumstances it 
is not reasonable to expect the person aggrieved to resort or to have resorted to it.”81 Following 
several cases in which the confusion caused by these conflicting provisions were considered,82 
the Court of Appeal stated that where serious allegations of maladministration are made: 
 
“Such allegations could best be investigated by the resources and powers of the 
Commissioners, with her powers to compel both disclosure of documents, and the 
giving of assistance to the investigation… the Commissioner's investigation and 
report can provide the just remedy when judicial review might fail to; and can 
reach facts which might not emerge under the judicial review process.”83 
 
In doing so, the Court of Appeal reinforced the importance of promoting the Commissioner’s 
work, a message repeated in a later judgment which opined that “those advising individuals 
                                                 
76 See e.g. R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Balchin [1996] EWHC Admin 152 at 
[14], per Sedley J: “...so far as a court of judicial review is concerned the question is not how maladministration 
should be defined but only whether the Commissioner's decision is within the range of meaning which the English 
language and the statutory purpose together make possible. For the rest, the question whether any given set of 
facts amounts to maladministration - or by parity of reasoning, to injustice - is for the Commissioner alone.” 
77 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B3.4. 
78 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B3.5. 
79 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, , B4.1. 
80 Local Government Act 1974 s.26(6)(c). 
81 Local Government Act 1974 s. 26(6).  
82 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B4.1. 
83 R v Local Commissioner for Local Government ex p Liverpool City Council [2000] EWCA Civ 54 at [28]. 
12 
 
regarding matters potentially giving rise to both local ombud investigations and to judicial 
review should first seek an investigation by a local ombud.”84  
 
A similar overlap of jurisdictional competence occurred in disputes between ombuds and other 
public bodies. In several cases involving the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher 
Education (OIA), for instance, the courts have attempted to clarify the grey line between the 
competences of universities and the OIA on the matter of academic judgement. In other OIA 
cases, the court has clarified that it is not the office’s role to enforce disability discrimination 
law or investigate criminal conduct.85 Likewise, three cases involving the SLCC dealt with the 
question of how the office should deal with complaints which contained both a ‘service’ and a 
‘conduct’ element. Such ‘hybrid’ complaints created a boundary clash of functional 
responsibility between the SLCC and the legal professions responsible for investigating 
conduct matters.86  
 
In most of these ‘allocation of power’ decisions, the judicial input in ombudn case law involved 
resolving clashes and ambiguities created by incompatible legislation which could no longer 
be worked around without judicial input. In doing so, the court unavoidably advanced the law 
incrementally and may be described as performing an essential institutional design function.87  
 
 
Findings II: Grounds 
 
Judicial focus on the reasoning of ombuds 
 
To evidence the contours of the relationship between ombuds and the courts, we interrogated 
the ways in which the bench applied common law grounds. Our study found that the most 
common ground for an ombud decision to be quashed was the quality of reasoning that 
supported the decision (Figure 1). This category includes twelve cases in which an ombud 
decision was quashed due to flaws in its reasoning and ten in which decisions were found to be 
irrational.88  
 
Several patterns of judicial decision-making were evident from this sample of ombud case law. 
First, judges are very prepared to deconstruct failings in the evidence provided in the ombud’s 
determinations. This focus on adequacy of reasoning is largely justified on the basis of the 
statutory duty of ombuds to give reasons at various stages of the decision-making process. This 
chimes with other studies that have found that the judicial approach to adequacy of reasons is 
largely dictated by the context of the statutory scheme under review.89  
 
Most of the irrationality cases in the ombud case sample can equally be understood as an attack 
on the quality of reasoning used to explain the decision and the weight given to the relevant 
factors involved. For example, in JR55, the court criticised the failure of the relevant ombud to 
                                                 
84 R v Local Commissioner For Local Government Ex p Scholarstica Umo [2003] EWHC 3202; [2004] E.L.R. 
265 at [17]. 
85 Maxwell v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2011] EWCA Civ 1236; [2012] E.L.R. 
538 and Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B4.2. 
86 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, B4.3. 
87 Peter Cane has suggested that this function is a big part of US judicial review: Peter Cane, “Understanding 
Judicial Review and its Impact” in M. Hertogh and S. Halliday (eds), Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: 
International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (CUP, 2004), 15. 
88 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, C1. 
89 See Bell, “Reason-Giving in Administrative Law”.  
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provide an explanation for the quantum of compensation recommended, stating that the 
decision was “plucked out of the air” and was “lacking any rational basis”.90 Likewise in ruling 
that a decision had been made irrationally because the complaint had been misunderstood, the 
judge said in Kelly:  
 
“This is not a reasons challenge, but the absence of adequate reasoning is relied on 
in support of the substantial challenge that there has been a failure to take into 
account the real complaint. Whether the ombudsman did take account of the real 
complaint is to be determined on the basis of the reasons he gave for his decision.”91 
 
In fact, in general most of the case law which was decided on discretionary impropriety (eg 
failure to take into account relevant considerations) can also be understood as a deconstruction 
of the reasons provided by the ombud. This included a failure to take into account a pre-existing 
legal requirement, whether outlined in statute or previous case law, or other relevant 
considerations that flowed from the facts of the complaint or the ombud’s own guidance.92 A 
similar observation can be made about the use of the ground of mistake. We found that in six 
cases the mistake ground reflected a willingness on the part of the court to unpick the reasoning 
deployed in the decision and/or test the robustness of the ombud’s findings back to the evidence 
used to support the decision.93  
 
A final observation is that, in at least sixteen cases the judiciary used dicta to express 
instructions to an ombud on the reason-giving standards they expect from such an institution, 
notwithstanding the non-judicial role of the ombud. Such standards apply at various stages of 
its decision-making process, not just final reports.94  This is significant, in that legislation 
constituting ombuds provide no such detail other than to require reasons for determinations 
made. This approach shows the weight that courts give to the policy framework in question: in 
the ombud context particular weight is given to the quality of reasons, presumably because the 
ombud is part of the accountability architecture, and as such should adhere closely to principles 
of good administration. 
 
Judicial expectations of procedural fairness standards  
 
It has been a long standing concern that, through judicial review, the judiciary would develop 
and impose procedural fairness standards on the ombud sector that would neuter its more 
flexible method of investigation and decision-making.95 Our study identified that although 
common law procedural fairness grounds were raised regularly,96 in only three cases did this 
ground cause a court to quash an ombud decision.97  
 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals an impactful role nonetheless being performed by the courts 
in considering procedural fairness grounds. To begin with, the role judicial review plays 
through upholding ombud decisions, and thereby helping to legitimise the decision-making 
processes of the ombud, should not be understated. Multiple cases stand out as providing robust 
                                                 
90 JR55 at [30].  
91 Kelly v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2017] EWHC 3581 (Admin); [2017] C.T.L.C. 107 at [32]. 
92 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, C2. 
93 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, C2. 
94 See Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, C3.  
95 Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration, 482. 
96 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, C2, A5-A64. 
97 Siborurema v Office of the Independent Adjudicator [2007] EWCA Civ 1365; [2008] E.L.R. 209; Stenhouse v 
The Legal Ombudsman & Anor [2016] EWHC 612 (Admin); [2016] A.C.D. 59; Miller. 
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support for the scheme in question’s processes.98 In adopting this approach, the courts are 
ordinarily strongly influenced by the nature of the statutory scheme concerned,99  and the 
deliberate intention to create a dispute resolution service that operates differently to the court. 
To paraphrase the words of Lord Justice Mummery in a case on the OIA, if the ombud is to 
 
“… act as a surrogate of the … court … it is difficult to see what point there would 
be in having a scheme, which was established … not as another court of law or 
tribunal, but as a more user friendly and affordable alternative procedure for airing 
… complaints and grievances. The judicialisation of the [ombudsman] so that it has 
to perform the same fact-finding functions and to make the same decisions on 
liability as the ordinary courts and tribunals would not be in the interests of 
[complainants] generally.”100 
 
Despite this general support, the courts have also developed a control capacity in ombud case 
law through obiter and guidance statements. Various statements on the law have led to a fine-
tuning of specific procedural standards beyond legislative requirements. For instance, the 
courts have emphasised the importance of schemes developing internal guidance to describe in 
more detail their processes, and once in place the courts have expected that guidance to be 
followed.101 The courts have also stated that an ombud should normally disclose the material 
or documentary evidence on which their decisions are going to rely so as to allow each of the 
parties the opportunity to make comments or rebut.102 In disclosing such material, the courts 
have confirmed that an ombud is entitled to request undertakings that any such material will be 
kept confidential.103 The courts have also considered the extent to which an ombud can lawfully 
extend a complaint mid-investigation once more information has been obtained.104 An ombud 
is now required to follow a consultation process with the affected parties, including the 
provision of explanatory information, before making such an extension to the complaint.105 
Most recently the courts have provided guidance on the importance of not being seen to 
predetermine a decision when issuing a preliminary finding of fact.106 In addition, several cases 
which turned upon statutory interpretation can be seen to provide additional guidance on 
procedural fairness standards. For instance, Cavanagh and JR55, discussed earlier in this piece, 
were concerned with the due process owed to individual medical practitioners where their 
reputation was at stake.  
 
Use of precedent 
 
                                                 
98 See Morrison v The Independent Police Complaints Commission and Ors [2009] EWHC 2589 (Admin); [2009] 
Po. L.R. 382; Sandhar v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2011] EWCA Civ 1614; 
[2012] E.L.R. 160; Miah v Independent Police Complaints Commission [2017] EWCA Civ 2108; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 
3817; Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service [2008] EWCA Civ 642; [2008] Bus. L.R. 
1486; Calland v Financial Ombudsman Service [2013] EWHC 1327 (Admin). 
99 Eg Kerman & Co Llp  v Legal Ombudsman [2014] EWHC 3726 (Admin); [2015] 1 W.L.R. 2081 at [61]. 
100 Maxwell at [37]-[38]. 
101 Miah [2017] EWCA Civ 2108; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 3817.  
102 Turpin v Commissioner for Local Administration [2001] EWHC Admin 503; [2002] J.P.L. 326; Miller. 
103 Kay v Health Service Commissioner [2008] EWHC 2063 (Admin). 
104 Hession; Cavanagh; Miller; JR55. 
105 Miller at [42]-[47]. 
106 Miller at [57]-[66].  
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Our coding scheme also captured the ways in which judicial precedent was used. Although 
throughout the study judgments showed loyalty to precedent,107 they only rarely relied upon, 
or engaged meaningfully with, leading judicial review cases outside the ombud context. 
Notable exceptions are in some OIAHE cases, where for example the court relied upon Smith108 
in finding that a lack of hearing before the OIA did not render its process unfair109, and upon 
Magill110 in dismissing an allegation that the OIAHE was biased towards HEIs because it is 
funded by HEIs. 111  In general, however, the dominant approach was an analysis of the 
arguments placed before the court, viewed in context of the statutory scheme in question.  
 
By contrast, there was some evidence of the development of a bespoke body of case law both 
around individual schemes and across schemes, with judgments regularly confirming a 
consistent account of the underlying principles of law that can be discerned from legislation 
and case law in the sector. The pattern with most case law has been that early pioneering cases 
have both established the principle that the ombud can be judicially reviewed and laid out the 
fundamentals of the position that should be adopted when reviewing a particular scheme.112 
This case is thereafter regularly cited as authority for the judicial approach, as more focused 
judicial input is built up around the specific features of ombud practice. OIAHE cases, for 
instance, referred regularly to Siborurema113, and Maxwell114, whilst for Financial Ombudsman 
Services (FOS) cases, Heather115, and IFG Financial116 were important starting points. There 
is also evidence of a cross-fertilisation of principles in case law across different schemes, with 
for example leading statements on the definition of maladministration cited across the study.117 
This indicates a willingness of the judiciary to develop a coherent body of law appropriate to 
the needs of the sector, where appropriate. Such an approach has however been backed up by 
a requirement to pay close attention to the schemes particular context. Indeed, it is commonly 
asserted that the “degree and manner of supervision to be exercised by the court will vary from 
institution to institution and from statutory scheme to statutory scheme”.118  
 
 
Approaches to judicial review: lessons from ombud case law 
 
Our study has focused narrowly on ombud case law to understand empirically the work that 
judges do in administrative law. From this study, we draw three broad conclusions. 
 
                                                 
107 In only three cases did the court reject or disregard previous rulings, and in none of these instances was the 
ombudsman’s decision overridden, or their discretionary power reduced: Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online 
Appendix”, C4. 
108 Smith v Parole Board for England and Wales  [2005] UKHL 1; [2005] H.R.L.R. 8. 
109 Budd v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2010] EWHC 1056 (Admin);  [2010] 
E.L.R. 579  at [92].  
110 Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] A.C. 357.  
111 Sandhar at [23]. 
112 R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p Dyer [1994] 1 W.L.R. 621; [1994] C.O.D. 331; R v 
Local Commissioner for Administration, Ex parte Eastleigh Borough Council [1988] 1 QB 855; Siborurema 
[2007] EWCA Civ 1365; [2008] E.L.R. 209 ; Crawford v The Legal Ombudsman & Anor [2014] EWHC 182; 
[2014] A.C.D. 100; Muldoon v IPCC [2009] EWHC 3633. 
113 Siborurema. 
114 Miah.  
115 Heather. 
116 IFG [2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin). 
117 See Liverpool [2000] EWCA Civ 54 at [3]; R v Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East 
of England ex parte Bradford Metropolitan CC [1979] Q.B. 287; [1979] 2 W.L.R. 1 at [311]-[312]. 
118 Siborurema [2007] EWCA Civ 1365 at [51].  
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Most ombud case law is entirely orthodox 
 
Sometimes the strongest findings are the least interesting, but they need to be reiterated 
nevertheless. If the purpose of administrative law is to establish and apply a consistent model 
of principles, then in two respects ombud case law measures up strongly.   
 
First, the principle of ultra vires lies right at the heart of ombud case law, implicitly dictating 
how almost all judgments were arrived at, with the technique of statutory interpretation central 
to the vast majority of judgments. This is consistent with traditional accounts on the role of 
judges in judicial review: construing statutes to determine the parameters of the administrative 
power in question.119 It is also in keeping with other empirical studies which find that most 
judicial review cases turn upon statutory interpretation.120 Notably, we identified only two 
judgments that could be said to depart from narrow interpretations of legislation in an 
unorthodox fashion.  
 
Second, most literature on administrative law recognises that judicial review both operates as 
a remedy of last resort and a safeguard to ensure that public authority is exercised within the 
boundaries of the law.121 Our findings are entirely consistent with this prescription, with ombud 
case law providing more a “safety valve” function for managing dissatisfied users of ombud 
services than a route to individual redress. In deciding which cases are to be heard, the courts 
are loyal to a strong filtering system that focuses attention on the underlying relevance of the 
legal question before the court. Most applications for judicial review do not satisfy this test. It 
is not possible for us to verify that all cases on the ombud have been captured in our study 
given the vagaries of online reporting but it is telling that we found more rejected oral 
permission hearings than cases heard by way of full hearing, with a lack of arguable grounds 
the most common reason for refusal.122 Additionally, ombuds report high levels of applications 
failing at the written stage or being withdrawn even before they get that far.123 Ultimately, in 
our sample only 29 out of 109 fully heard cases resulted in an ombud decision being 
overturned.124 This compares to an annual turnover of over 500,000 complaints in the sector. 
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that litigation is settled out of court on a regular basis.125  
  
The judiciary perform a structuring role in ombud case law  
 
This case study suggests that the courts routinely approach ombud judicial review in a way 
which chimes with general accounts of administrative law. However, our study reveals some 
marked consistencies across the ombud case law which are difficult to account for other than 
due to the specialized context of the ombud’s work. A number of commentators have observed 
that the judiciary has the potential to perform a “structuring”126 or “hortatory”127 function. Here 
the purpose of judicial input is to detail and expand upon expected standards of good 
                                                 
119 See e.g. Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 A.C. 768; [1982] 2 W.L.R. 92 
at 813-814. 
120 Nason, Reconstructing Judicial Review, 159. 
121 See Wade, Administrative Law. 
122 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, D1. 
123 See Felicity Mitchell, “The OIA and Judicial Review: Ten Principles from Ten Years of Challenges” (2015), 
https://www.oiahe.org.uk/media/1885/oia-and-judicial-review-fm.pdf [accessed 22 January 2020] 11.  
124 Kirkham and O’Loughlin, “Online Appendix”, D2. 
125 Richard Kirkham, “Judicial Review, Litigation Effects and the Ombudsman” (2018) 40(1) J.S.W.F.L. 110. 
126 David Feldman, “Judicial Review: A way of controlling government” (1988) 66 Pub. Adm. 21.  
127 P.S. Atiyah, “From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law” 
(1980) 65 (5) Iowa L. Rev. 1249. 
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administration or even allocating powers and responsibilities between different constitutional 
actors. Our findings suggest that this latter set of functions best explains the variance from 
general administrative law that we detected in ombud case law. Three generic patterns support 
this conclusion.   
 
First, the courts often adopted bespoke solutions because the general principles of 
administrative law simply did not provide the analytical detail, by themselves, required to 
resolve the problem before the court. On reasons for instance, whilst leading case law such as 
South Bucks Council128 might offer a basic starting point, judges in our sample tended either to 
launch directly into an immanent critique of the ombud’s decision based on the factual context 
and arguments placed before the court, or worked towards the development of bespoke criteria 
relevant to the specific ombud context being dealt with. This led to the kinds of citation patterns 
described above, where clusters of cases are gathering, and act as tailored precedent in cases 
related to a particular scheme. 
 
Second, whilst deference to the work of the ombud is built into the judicial approach as a result 
of the statutory context, an analysis of ombud case law reveals that there is a small but 
significant strand of case law in which an intensive review of ombud practice has been 
exercised beyond that required by general administrative law doctrine, particularly on issues 
related to procedural fairness, and on quality of reasons. Some judgments defended this 
approach according to the statutory demands of the ombud scheme under scrutiny, suggesting 
a concern for ensuring that a partner justice institution is operating at the highest standards 
appropriate given its statutory role.  
 
A third pattern in ombud case law is the degree of institutional design work being performed. 
In most such cases, the judicial role is one of managing the boundary lines of power between 
different institutions. Ordinarily this work is undertaken uncontroversially through narrow 
statutory interpretations, thereby filling gaps in the law created by institutional overlaps with 
other bodies. However, sometimes it draws the judge into more controversial areas of decision-
making. This is illustrated by two new legal remedies that the court has effectively introduced 
to resolve or head-off disputes between an ombud, public bodies and individual complainants.  
 
The first remedy is that upon which most of the case law in this article is based, namely the 
right to challenge the ombud by way of judicial review. Given that an ombud invariably has no 
legal power to confer a remedy or create rights for individuals, there is a viable argument that 
there is no need for the courts to review ombud decisions.129 Whilst initially hesitant,130 and 
despite some resistance,131 the courts have claimed the jurisdiction of the ombud sector on the 
premise that ombuds derive their powers from statute. With the second remedy, the courts later 
repeated this redesign of the ombud landscape in a discrete series of four cases not included in 
the main study for this article, in which the courts accepted for review challenges to decisions 
of public authorities not to comply with ombud reports. In three of these cases, this led to the 
initial response of the public body to the ombud being quashed.132  
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In devising these remedies, the court took advantage of the flexibility inherent in the common 
law to grant itself a jurisdiction of review that had not been previously confirmed, albeit such 
a role might have been assumed.133 Thus the judiciary expanded its remit through reference to 
the purpose of the legislative scheme, even though it could be argued that the resolution of 
ombud reports belongs solely in the political domain. 134  From the judgments, it can be 
discerned that the new solutions were created (a) to enhance oversight of the sector and (b) to 
lend added bite to the power of ombud reports in scenarios where a public authority fails to pay 
sufficient respect to the office.135  
 
The structuring role is functionally defensible 
 
The variation of the application of general principles of administrative law according to context 
has raised concerns that the discipline might collapse into a “wilderness of single instances”. 
The performance of a structuring role is potentially even more controversial, as it implies that 
judges are better placed to develop the integrity of an administrative decision-making process 
than the administrative body itself or the legislature. Risks here include that judicial guidance 
can lack precision, be costly to implement, or be expressed in terms so out of line with the 
needs and perspectives of the administrator that it is of little value in practice.136 To protect the 
judiciary against such criticisms, various strategies are available, which we observed in ombud 
case law.  
 
First, the starting point for incrementally fine-tuning the law according to the administrative 
context is invariably rooted in either statute or existing common law grounds. For instance with 
the ombud sector, the Supreme Court stated that although different ombuds bear a “strong 
family resemblance… some of them have distinctive features which mean that considerable 
caution is required before principles derived from one legislative scheme can be read across to 
another.”137 This statement reflects a refinement of general administrative law to the particular 
context of the scheme. The constitutive statute is the starting point of adjudication, and drives 
the shaping of the parameters of judicial review. This entails that any case law derived from 
this approach may only have very limited or highly generalised applicability beyond the public 
body or sector concerned.    
 
Second, the structuring role should be performed as much, if not more, through methods that 
aim to influence the development of standards, as opposed to coercion.138 In this respect, the 
quantity of bespoke organisational guidance being provided in ombud case law is telling, but 
so are the different methods deployed, with judicial interventions regularly made not just 
through ratio and obiter, but through transparent nudges. Multiple examples can be cited of this 
approach. In Heather, Rix LJ’s concurring judgment reflected, entirely unprovoked, upon 
whether FOS had complied with the recommendations of the Hunt review, which had 
advocated greater transparency and predictability in the work of the FOS. The court also 
encouraged FOS to meet its requirement under the Financial Services and Management Act 
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137 JR55 [2016] UKSC 22 at [1]. 
138 See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
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2000 to keep a register of its monetary awards.139 Similarly, a strong judicial steer occurred in 
Bartos, when the court suggested that “the [SLCC] and the professional bodies may wish to 
reflect on the validity of the current practice” of the SLCC in dealing with complaints 
concerning both service and fitness to practise matters.140 In the same case, the ombud was 
reminded in a three paragraph ticking-off of the importance of impartiality, and that its staff 
should have “appropriate background and standing” to perform the function it had been 
allocated.141 In Dickie, the Court noted shortcomings in the Information Pack provided to 
prospective judicial applicants.142 Likewise, in Stenhouse the judge made clear his discomfort 
with the sizeable financial cost incurred in resolving the dispute which was “out of all 
proportion to the sums at stake”.143  Thus observations on the adequacy of administrative 
processes are occasionally made on the expectation that they will trigger a response in terms 
of revised practices, rather than being imposed by the judiciary.144  
 
Third, case law is more robust when there is sector-wide and legislative acquiescence of the 
judicial guidance. Care should be taken not to overstate this defence, as opportunities for 
legislative amendment may be rare or unrealistic, but in the ombud sector new legislation has 
been introduced in recent years, and through this process almost none of the judicial guidance 
identified as such in this case study has been overridden.145  
 
Despite occasional scepticism that a structuring function in judicial review can positively 
influence public administration,146 there is good reason to be optimistic about its impact in the 
ombud setting given the closeness in institutional remit and underlying values between the 
ombud and the judiciary.147 The influence that judicial review and the law has on public bodies 
will in part be dependent on a body’s overall legal culture,148  and, an ombud has strong 
reputational incentives to abide by both the spirit and the substance of judicial rulings. This is 
because the outward-facing legitimacy of the office is built around achieving classic rule of 
law objectives, such as justice, independence and procedural justice.149 The true value of this 
structuring role in judicial review requires further empirical study, but there is some evidence 
that the courts have used this in a targeted manner towards issues of relevance to the sector. 
The OIA has published a report outlining ten lessons learned from case law,150 and other 
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schemes have also changed their approach in direct response to cases, in matters such as 
clarifying the standards applied in their decisions151 and their reporting practice.152  
 
   
Conclusion 
 
Through a systematic content analysis study, this article has provided evidence of several 
patterns of judicial decision-making behaviour in ombud case law. In particular, our study 
found that an adherence to generalist administrative law standards was underscored by a 
marked trend towards structuring the law in order to add detail to good administration standards 
perceived to be appropriate for the ombud sector. This approach pairs a generally deferential 
position with a reserve function of shoring up administrative justice standards in the relevant 
schemes. 
 
The judicial strategies deployed in ombud case law demonstrate an approach to the intensity 
of its review exercise that is highly cognisant of institutional factors at play in the ombud sector. 
This insight suggests that the judiciary is capable of working to different judicial strategies and 
with different intensity in different fields.153 In some areas of public administration there will 
be a variety of reasons that may give rise to wider policy concerns about the legitimacy or value 
of moving beyond general administrative law,154 but these concerns do not appear to apply to 
the ombud sector. Public lawyers should invest more time identifying and rationalising these 
different patterns.  
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